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Abstract 
The US American political machine has always been concerned with science and technology. This focus 
strengthened following World War II as the US government substantially increased funding and work force to 
support basic and applied research as a major means to compete with and defend against other nations. An army of 
people now exists within the federal government whose job is to maintain our scientific and technological 
superpower status. Borrowing from the notion of the rhetorical presidency, this paper discusses the rise of the 
techno-political presidency in American politics. More specifically, the analysis closely analyzes Truman‟s 
“Bombing of Hiroshima” speech, examines significant Presidential scientific and technological discourse since, and 
speculates upon the implications of such a focus for our political future. This case highlights an important, but 
neglected area of rhetorical study—significant enough to warrant attention as a rhetorical sub-genre. 
 
Keywords: Presidential discourse, Rhetoric of technology, Political mythology, Genre, United States of America 
“Like all mythology in a politically conscious age, the idea of an electrical 
utopia can be and is exploited by established institutions . . . . Technology finally 
serves the very military and industrial policies it was supposed to prevent” 
(Cary and Quirk, 1970). 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Progress in science and technology has 
moved rapidly and unabated during the 
course of human existence. Despite a few 
noteworthy acts of resistance to major 
change, the totality of these protests is easily 
muted by the sounds of cheers and awe. The 
proof of humanity‟s excitement over new 
scientific and technological discoveries, like 
a child‟s fascination with magic, is evident 
in even our most mundane of historical 
documents, speeches, and scholarly 
writings. In fact, scientific and technological 
advancement has been a cornerstone of all 
modern civilizations, and our interest in it 
has very early beginnings. It has been such a 
large part of our democratic life, it is clear 
that a pro-technological attitude exists that 
has influenced political policy and the path 
of technological and scientific discovery in 
America. The following sections will 
investigate the scholarly literature on 
technology, myth, and genre, analyze a 
sampling of major presidential speeches that 
address the issue of science and technology, 
and speculate on the possibility of a pro-
technological discourse genre for rhetorical 
studies.  
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TECHNOLOGICAL MYTHOLOGY 
AND THE POLITICAL 
ESTABLISHMENT 
Few would challenge the idea that we are, as 
sociologist and philosopher Jacques Ellul 
(1964) has argued, a technological society. 
Technology seems to rule our existence. 
Through both accident and conscious effort, 
we have welcomed and grown comfortable 
with technology in our lives. Justifying this 
comfort is a strong, pro-technological 
mythology whose roots run deep into all 
facets of our civilization. This mythology 
keeps us optimistic about the future of 
science and technology in our lives. Despite 
technology‟s flirtations with doom and 
disaster, the mythology reminds us that 
technology has made our lives easier and 
more productive. In addition, this mythology 
convinces us to ignore the warnings and to 
instead put our faith entirely in science‟s 
ability to solve our world‟s problems. 
However, as Weisner and York (1964) 
argue, “if the great powers continue to look 
for solutions in the area of science and 
technology only, the result will be to worsen 
the situation" (p. 27). 
 
For good or ill, it is no revelation that we 
have increasingly perceived technology as 
something sacred. This is the claim of Ellul 
(1964), who asserted that we can no longer 
define technology simply as machines or 
applied science, because it has truly become 
a legitimate social institution. Humans, 
according to Ellul, have always been 
technology dependent and have always 
considered technological progress as a 
neutral, natural fact. This is the part of the 
mythology that, according to some critics, 
may very well bind us to a life of routine, 
passivity, and emptiness (See Frobish, 
2002). 
 
This technological mythology is not new, of 
course. Lewis Mumford (1932), the first 
major historian of technology, was the first 
to argue this point. Indeed, Mumford saw 
three phases of humanity‟s modern 
technological development: an eotechnic 
water-and-wood complex, the paleotechnic 
coal-and-iron complex, and the neotechnic 
electricity-and-alloy complex (p. 110). In 
each of these eras, Mumford and others 
show how technology was glorified as a new 
beginning for humanity and its savior (See 
Carey and Quick, 1970; Marvin, 1988). The 
mythology that technology makes things 
better, then, regardless if it is an illusion is 
commonplace and significant. 
 
As a theoretical springboard toward 
understanding how this myth plays out in 
the political arena, we consult James W. 
Ceaser, Glen Thurow, Jeffery Tulis, and 
Joseph Bessette‟s (1981) influential article, 
“The Rise of the Rhetorical Presidency.” In 
their article, they claim that there has been a 
powerful shift in presidential leadership. 
“Prior to this century,” they claim, “popular 
leadership through rhetoric was suspect. 
Presidents rarely spoke directly to the 
people, preferring communications between 
the branches of the government” (Medhurst, 
2004). Over course of many decades, 
however, presidents have increasingly 
preferred proving leadership through 
exercises in public discourse. This has led to 
the perception that words replace action as 
the gauge of presidential achievement. The 
authors write that this shift to the rhetorical 
presidency opposes the founders‟ view of 
the political establishment, and is counter to 
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the way the political system is designed to 
operate - governing through law-making, not 
public discourse. 
 
Modern presidential leadership is now 
consumed with speechmaking. In fact, 
Esbaugh-Soha (2010) has suggested that 
presidents use speeches as a mechanism to 
influence Congress and policymaking 
indirectly through the pressure of public 
support. The content of these speeches, he 
writes, focuses on a diversity of domestic 
and foreign matters, and is calculated 
strategy, which is determined by, among 
other factors, the political and economic 
environment as well as the president‟s 
approval ratings. Add to this the ever-
present news cycle and the dissemination of 
information on a global scale, according to 
Peak and Esbaugh-Soha (2008), and it is 
clear that it is imperative for presidents to 
address the nation through speeches, in turn 
seeking to influence media coverage of 
presidential agendas. Of importance to this 
research is the increased attention given to 
scientific and technological policy issues 
within presidential discourse. This also 
seems to mirror the rise in number of 
political offices and committees assigned to 
address national scientific or technological 
matters. This makes sense considering that 
our success in science and technology 
determines, in large part, our economic 
power and ranking as a first-world nation. It 
is in the president‟s best interest to make 
science and technology a priority both in 
terms of policy and speechmaking. The most 
significant cog is the public‟s interest, 
which, this paper argues, is sustained 
through a powerful mythology propagated 
by the political machinery that technology is 
good and worthy of our investment. 
A political myth, such as the one supposed 
here, is a combination of ideology and 
sacred belief, and more powerful than 
ordinary narratives. Such a myth, according 
to Bass and Cherwitz (1978), “selectively 
interprets and constructs a social reality, 
influencing the perception of events and 
relationships” (p. 217). Edelman (1971) 
argues that “a key condition of the 
domination of cognition by a political myth 
is the disposition of the anxious mind to take 
perceptions of present constraints as 
immutable: to avoid exploration of 
alternative possibilities” (p. 43). We often 
passively accept a myth, in other words, 
because we believe it to be an absolute and 
immutable truth (Bass and Cherwitz, p. 
217).  Moreover, a myth justifies itself by 
presenting a coherent and historically 
consistent reality, and “offers a selective 
interpretation of reality by joining normative 
and cognitive elements” (p. 218). 
 
If we accept Herbert Marcuse‟s (1964) 
belief that technology has always been the 
elite‟s favored tool of oppression, then we 
might expect the political establishment to 
favor technology by perpetuating pro-
technological attitudes through mythic 
discourse. Mueller (1973) claims that this 
rhetoric, however, must be plausible and 
validate the interests of the individual (p. 
102). In this case, the political system would 
endorse pro-technology programs such as 
corporate incentives and research grants to 
develop new technology, civil and 
environmental legislation that favor 
technological solutions to problems, and 
educational measures that push technology 
into the classroom. These programs would 
frame technological progress as always good 
and begetting of moral, intellectual, and 
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spiritual progress for humanity. The myth 
would also maintain that technology can 
make us happier, wealthier, and more 
productive. Therefore, it would, as Mueller 
suggests, “translate its economic needs and 
social aspirations into a coherent structure” 
(p. 102).  
 
 
We argue that such a pro-technological 
political myth exists in our society. It is a 
part of a master narrative that continually 
justifies itself and our interests. Because of 
the intersection of many phenomena that 
make us a smaller world (e.g., globalizing 
economy, advanced transportation, the 
Internet, and mass media), and our increased 
reliance on technology as a means of 
survival and leisure, this mythology is 
stronger today than ever. It is no wonder 
why Americans almost unilaterally believe 
in the importance of research to maintain 
our nation's strength (Branscomb, 2013). 
 
This myth is present in and exacerbated by 
presidential addresses that address major 
scientific and technological issues, and may 
constitute a discourse genre. Genres, 
according to Kathleen Hall Jamieson (1973), 
“are shaped in response to a rhetor‟s 
perception of the expectations of the 
audience and the demands of the situation” 
(p. 163). Campbell and Jamieson (1976) 
have elaborated further that “genres are 
groups of discourses which share 
substantive, stylistic, and situational 
characteristics” (p. 20). Genres are certainly 
significant rhetorical events. Campbell and 
Jamieson have suggested that they “are 
central to all types of criticism because they 
define the unique qualities of any rhetorical 
act, and because they are the means through 
which we come to understand how an act 
works to achieve its ends” (p. 10). As 
Bawarshi (2000) has argued, “genres do not 
simply help us define and organize kinds of 
texts; they also help us define and organize 
kinds of social actions, social actions that 
these texts rhetorically make possible” (p. 
335). The remainder of this paper, then, 
timelines the escalation of techno-politics in 
American history, closely analyzes one of 
the most significant speeches in 
technological politics, Truman‟s “Bombing 
of Hiroshima” address, and analyzes a small 
collection of presidential speeches regarding 
science and technology to test the 
parameters and significance of this genre of 
political discourse. 
 
TECHNO-POLITICS 
A pro-technological attitude existed early in 
American political history. The U.S. 
Constitution reads, for example, that 
Congress shall have the power “to promote 
the progress of science and useful arts by 
securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries.” This is 
an important and generally overlooked 
rhetorical statement. It reveals a 
commitment and obligation on the part of 
government to ensure scientific and 
technological progress. The Constitution 
also protects certain technologies via 
freedom of the press. Jefferson once 
remarked that “newspapers were more 
necessary than government itself, and he 
equated the technology of print and the 
protection of the rights of a free press with 
literacy and liberty" (Carey and Quirk, p. 6). 
Even our national anthem‟s “rockets‟ red 
glare” and “bombs bursting in air” hints at 
the role of technology in this early history. 
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Such rhetoric works to reinforce pro-
technological attitudes that have long 
invaded our social reality.  
 
Indeed, the myth that science and 
technology are positive variables in the 
human equation still persists and influences 
our political culture. As global awareness 
illuminates other developed countries‟ basic 
and applied scientific research—those with 
the potential to increase economies on a 
large scale—U.S. government officials are 
more than ever touting the importance of our 
own scientific and technological 
developments. Ben Bernanke (2011), 
Chairman of the U.S. Federal reserve has 
even stated, for example, that our 
government‟s achievements in research and 
development, specifically basic scientific 
research, is a means to sustain the United 
States‟ position as a global leader.  
 
We are facing a political present surrounded 
by issues of science and technology. We 
have seen, for example, since World War II, 
the rise in influence of the scientific and 
technological political office. There are 
hundreds of such political offices. Within 
the White House, for example, sits the 
Office of Science and Technology Policy, 
created in 1976, which “plays a critical 
investment role in maintaining American 
leadership in science and technology" 
(Office, 1999). The President‟s Cabinet 
consists of several such groups including the 
Department of Agriculture, Department of 
Energy, Department of Health and Human 
Services, Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, and the Department of 
Transportation—all of which privilege 
science and technology. Among the many 
federal agencies and commissions are the 
National Aeronautic Space Administration, 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
Environmental Protection Agency, Federal 
Communications Commission, National 
Science Foundation, National Technology 
Transfer Center, Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, President‟s Council on 
Sustainable Development, and the United 
States Chemical Safety and Hazard 
Investigation Board. Furthermore, at least 
dating back to President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, according to Sargent and Shea 
(2012), presidents have sought out scientific 
experts in academia to advise them on 
research and development issues. 
 
We could examine groups such as 
President‟s Clinton‟s Information 
Infrastructure Task Force or we could list 
the several dozen technology committees 
within Congress, but the evidence is clear. 
The typical political arm is preoccupied by 
science and technology. Indeed, much of the 
President‟s office and cabinet, White House 
offices and agencies, and Congressional 
committees are assigned to issues not of 
civic policy, but of science and technology. 
In fact, more than $142 billion is estimated 
for total US government research and 
development (R&D), an increase of 1.2% 
since 2012 and $60 billion since 1978 
(Proposal, 2013). In addition to federal 
dollars spent on research and development, 
the government also relies on private 
investments into science and technology 
research, according to Bernanke (2011), 
which typically focuses on applied research 
as opposed to basic research. Today‟s 
industrial expenditures can account for more 
than 70% of total US spending in this area, 
for a US total of $470 billion, making us the 
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biggest spender on scientific and 
technological research in the world (Smart 
Planet, 2013).  
 
While the US government has always 
generously supported spending on R&D, 
there is also evidence that it has worked to 
adjust attitudes to gain popular support. In 
1973, for example, a federally subsidized 
group called the Health, Education, and 
Welfare Task Force (HEW) was developed 
to study the increasing resistance to 
automation in the workplace. They reported 
that “the impact of technology has been 
acutely felt by the blue-collar workers as 
measured by absenteeism, turnover rates, 
wildcat strikes, sabotage, poor quality 
products, and a reluctance of workers to 
commit themselves to their work tasks" 
(Sale, 1995, p. 251). HEW suggested to 
corporations that, to assuage concerns and 
future resistance, they should “allow 
workers more participation in workplace 
decisions and should reassure them about 
the profits possible from the introduction of 
new technology” (p. 251; italics added). The 
assurance of “profits” as aligned with 
technological progress is a common 
component of a pro-tech rhetoric designed to 
promote positive feelings toward 
technology. But it is only certain types of 
technology that the government supports. 
Congressman Sensenbrenner, Chairman of 
the House Committee on Science, has 
asserted that “federal R&D should focus on 
essential programs that are long term, high 
risk, non-commercial, cutting edge, well 
managed and have great potential for 
scientific discovery” (See Branscomb, 
2013). “Funding for programs,” 
furthermore, “that do not meet this standard 
should be eliminated or decreased to enable 
new initiatives" (See Branscomb). If done 
right, according to Cita Furlani (1994), 
Director of the National Coordination Office 
for IT R&D, Federal investments in 
technology “will help shape our long-term 
ability to succeed as a Nation." Branscomb 
(2013) argues that this type of discourse is 
borne from and continually feeds a pro-
technological attitude, claiming, “Research 
policy that creates new understanding of 
technology as well as new science is 
[according to the government] a key to 
realizing that goal and resolving some of the 
political conflicts over how public dollars 
should be spent.” 
 
Soon after gaining office, the Clinton-Gore 
administration published both its technology 
and science policies. These documents 
illustrate the powerful commitment of 
modern politics to such research since both 
call for an expansion of government 
intervention in science and technology, with 
the end goal being to secure our 
technological superiority in the global 
market. Clinton‟s science policy, for 
example, argued three basic points: 1) “U.S. 
scientists must be among those working at 
the leading edge in all major fields in order 
for us to retain and improve our competitive 
position in the long term,” 2) “we can and 
must do more to identify and coordinate 
research thrusts aimed at strategic goals” 
and 3) “we must not limit our future by 
restricting the range of our inquiry” (The 
White House, 2013). We saw it in Clinton‟s 
agenda to put a computer in every classroom 
and in Vice-President Gore‟s (1992) Earth in 
the Balance, where he suggested linking 
technology with nature. Even Newt 
Gingrich's (1995) To Renew America had a 
chapter entitled "Tending the Gardens of the 
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Earth: Scientifically Based 
Environmentalism." 
 
More recently, President Obama‟s White 
House technology page (2013) reads that a 
21
st
 century digital infrastructure is the key 
to our nation‟s “long-term prosperity and 
competitiveness,” which includes “high-
speed broadband Internet access, fourth-
generation (4G) wireless networks, new 
health care information technology and a 
modernized electrical grid.” Obama‟s 
presidency, like other presidents before him, 
is strongly concerned with science and 
technology. In fact, on his first day in office, 
Obama created the first ever position for a 
U.S. Chief Technology Officer.  
 
With hundreds of years of similar evidence 
found within the annals of US history, it is 
no wonder why Americans almost 
unilaterally believe science and technology. 
While Branscomb (2013) characterizes the 
modern political commitment as the 
“time-honored U.S. policy that every federal 
agency should invest in basic scientific 
research,” its modern genesis begins with 
the invention of the atomic bomb, Truman‟s 
decision to drop it, and important also, his 
speech the day after. This speech plays a 
significant role as the catalyst for the 
cultivated technological and scientific focus 
in today‟s politics.  
 
TRUMAN’S ANNOUNCEMENT 
On July 25, 1945, President Harry Truman 
wrote in his personal diary that “we have 
discovered the most terrible bomb in the 
history of the world. It may be the fire 
destruction prophesied in the Euphrates 
Valley Era, after Noah and his fabulous Ark 
. . . It seems to be the most terrible thing 
ever discovered” (See Ferrel, 1980). His 
tone was overtly critical of atomic power 
and aware of the possible global 
implications of the technology. This is not 
the tone of his radio address to the American 
people, however (Public Papers, 1961). In 
his public address, Truman emphasizes the 
goodness of the bomb, its power to cleanse, 
and its strength to win the war over evil. 
There is obviously a rhetorical contradiction 
between the two messages. What follows is 
a textual reading of his public statement.  
 
Truman started his announcement by 
stressing the military importance of the 
Hiroshima bombing and downplaying 
human loss. “Sixteen hours ago,” said 
Truman in 1945, “an American airplane 
dropped one bomb on Hiroshima, an 
important Japanese Army base.” Equating 
an entire Japanese city with a military base 
dehumanizes the event, downplaying the 
significance of what just happened. His next 
few sentences also failed to capture the 
larger picture - the 70,000-80,000 lives, or 
30% of the city‟s population, that were just 
annihilated. He continued, “The bomb had 
more power than 20,000 tons of T.N.T. It 
had more than two thousand times the blast 
power of the British „Grand Slam‟ which is 
the largest bomb ever yet used in the history 
of warfare.” The numbers work to amaze 
and distract. This first paragraph so 
effectively diminishes the human element 
that it sets a tone that persists.  
 
Like the opening paragraph of the speech, 
Truman‟s later words highlighted the 
military gains realized through the bomb. 
Examine how he proposes that the bomb 
assists, more efficiently, the military agenda:  
62 
Covenant Journal of Communication (CJOC) Vol. 1, No. 1 (Maiden Edition), July, 2013 
 
 
63 
 
We are now prepared to 
obliterate more rapidly and 
completely every productive 
enterprise the Japanese have 
above ground in any city. We 
shall destroy their docks, their 
factories, and their 
communications. Let there be 
no mistake; we shall destroy 
Japan‟s power to make war.  
 
His choice of words, more, rapidly, and 
completely, characterizes what we 
commonly expect from technology. They 
are employed to highly the positive benefits 
of our new capabilities. It is a common 
formula. Truman can now assert that, “what 
has been done is the greatest achievement of 
organized science in history.” This one 
statement epitomizes the entire message and 
sets the stage for his later appeals.  
 
Truman‟s rhetoric attempted to drive our 
attention away from tragedy and toward 
technological achievement. He precisely 
pictured the awesome achievement of the 
atomic bomb in his speech, making sure to 
avoid the type of language he uses in his 
diary. Note how destruction becomes 
transformed into something good: “with this 
bomb we have now added a new and 
revolutionary increase in destruction to 
supplement the growing power of our armed 
forces.” “New,” “revolutionary,” “increase,” 
“supplement, and “growing,” are words of 
progress, words that show forward action. 
Indeed, Truman remarked that the atomic 
bomb is the “greatest destructive force in 
history.” “Greatest” and “destructive force” 
were juxtaposed in such a way to connote 
what Carey and Quirk (1970) argue is the 
"Myth of the Powerhouse." The myth of the 
powerhouse, as seen in Truman‟s rhetoric, 
reconciles apparent contradictions, a 
combination of hope with destruction, 
goodness with obliteration.  
 
Truman claimed that atomic power holds 
much promise as a form of energy, and 
again works to distract a listening public 
away from the tragic and disastrous 
implications. This rhetorical move marks a 
significant part of the mythology of techno-
politics. “In their present form,” asserted 
Truman, “these bombs are now in 
production and even more powerful forms 
are in development. …We now have two 
great plants and many lesser works devoted 
to the production of atomic power.”  
 
Winning the war with atomic power is not in 
question, then. The real issue was how to 
best utilize this technology after the war. 
Truman, in answer, claimed that atomic 
energy “may in the future supplement the 
power that now comes from coal, oil, and 
falling water, but at the present it cannot be 
produced on a basis to compete with them 
commercially.” Truman, of course, did not 
mean to pause its movement forward. He 
established the warrant for future atomic 
research and development: “before that 
comes [or atomic power as a competitive 
power source] there must be a long period of 
intensive research.” With this one statement, 
Truman maintains a political hold on atomic 
scientific and technological progress, and 
essentially is in a position to sway popular 
opinion that the technology is good. Truman 
thus validated his actions of his Hiroshima 
decision and secured a future atomic 
presence by grounding his language in 
commercial terms.  
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Nevertheless, Truman had not emptied his 
rhetorical toolbox. Truman strengthened his 
persuasive appeals in yet a third tongue, 
naturalistic language. He transformed 
technological progress into a near romantic 
enterprise. Truman declared, “It is an atomic 
bomb. It is a harnessing of the basic power 
of the universe. The force from which the 
sun draws its power has been loosed against 
those who brought war to the Far East.” 
Additionally, he claimed, “the fact that we 
can release atomic energy ushers in a new 
era in man‟s understanding of nature‟s 
forces.” The atomic bomb, therefore, has 
created a completely new civilization for 
humanity, one that is healthy and positive.  
 
Like the war overseas, Truman characterized 
technological progress as a fight. Indeed, the 
international race to discover how the atom 
could be harnessed became synecdochic for 
the war. Truman asserted, for example, that 
by 1942, “we knew that the Germans were 
working feverishly to find a way to add 
atomic energy to the other engines of war 
with which they hoped to enslave the 
world.” Thus, we see the motive: it was a 
necessary evil. We had no choice, Truman 
argued, but to enter “the race of discovery 
against the Germans.” The “battle of the 
laboratories,” he told us, “held fateful risks 
for us as well as the battles of the air, land 
and sea, and we have now won the battle of 
the laboratories as we have won the other 
battles.” But technological progress is worth 
the risk, and, hence, another part of the 
techno-political mythology is borne.  
 
Still, the question of post-war uses plagued 
Truman. Again, he tried to answer this 
concern. He told us that this “greatest 
scientific gamble in history” was an 
“advancement of knowledge.” Besides, it 
must continue since  
The greatest marvel is not the 
size of the enterprise, its 
secrecy, nor its cost, but the 
achievement of scientific 
brains in putting together 
fields of science into a 
workable plan. And hardly 
less marvelous has been the 
capacity of industry to design, 
and of labor to operate, the 
machines and methods to do 
things never done before so 
that the brain child of many 
minds came forth in physical 
shape and performed as it was 
supposed to do.  
 
Truman now likened the progress of atomic 
technology to intellectual progress in 
general, characterizing the effort as a 
brainchild. How foolish it would be, he 
seemed to suggest, to abandon the atomic 
project—our child.  
 
In an expected rhetorical maneuver given 
previous attempts, Truman made it clear that 
he supported an atomic future for America 
and would support funding. Truman 
avowed, in this last paragraph, the 
following: 
I shall recommend that the 
Congress of the United States 
consider promptly the 
establishment of an appropriate 
commission to control the 
production and use of atomic 
power within the United States. I 
shall give further consideration 
and make further 
recommendations to the 
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Congress as to how atomic 
power can become a powerful 
and forceful influence towards 
the maintenance of world peace. 
  
The President equated atomic power with 
future peace, not just through active use of 
the weaponry, but even the simple existence 
of the technology. The simple existence of 
the bomb would maintain peace. 
“Maintenance”—a passive construct—
signifies an obligatory stance, that we no 
longer have a choice in the matter if we wish 
to protect the free world. Truman also 
claimed that, “under present circumstances,” 
he would not “divulge the technical 
processes of production or all the military 
applications.” The atomic project, then, 
becomes a government project, and the 
technology becomes military property.  
 
The tone throughout the announcement is 
obviously not the same tone as that in 
Truman‟s diary. The attitude within his diary 
is skeptical, even cynical toward the 
technology. His attitude transformed, 
however, when he moved from private 
correspondence to public address. There is a 
big difference between saying that the bomb 
is “the most terrible thing ever discovered,” 
for example, and it is the “greatest 
achievement of organized science in 
history.” Truman‟s public demeanor denoted 
optimism and nationalistic pride, inspired by 
a seemingly utopian attitude toward a 
technocratic world. Technology for the 
Truman Administration is publicly and 
politically progressive, morally and 
intellectually good.  
 
Truman‟s rhetorical work reveals five basic 
tenets of this pro-techno political myth. 
First, political discourse must frame 
technology in terms of economic, 
intellectual, and moral goodness. Second, 
the advance of technology makes life better: 
efficient and more productive. Third, 
technological development will allow citizen 
activation, democratization, and 
decentralized government. Fourth, any 
technological move is the best of 
alternatives—a move that will, of course, 
requires economic and popular support. 
Fifth, any setback in the face of 
technological progress is a worthy and 
honorable sacrifice, given that the end 
product of said progress is of larger 
significance. These five tenets constitute the 
techno-political myth, which is sustained by 
presidential discourse ever since.  
 
His rhetoric typifies how presidents have 
responded generally to science and 
technology issues since. We should not 
forget that the bomb was actually designed 
under Roosevelt‟s watch, including that of 
Vannevar Bush, Roosevelt‟s Scientific 
Advisor and later overseer of the Manhattan 
Project. And while there was a need at this 
time for a  political structure that would 
protect the atomic secrets, it was Truman‟s 
decision to drop the bomb in Hiroshima that 
forced new demands for tight government 
control, new political offices, new 
committees, and so forth. The atomic age 
had begun, and the US political machine had 
to reign control over it. Philosopher of 
technology Langdon Winner (1989) 
expresses this fact well:  
The atom bomb is an inherently 
political artifact. As long as it 
exists at all, its lethal properties 
demand that it be controlled by 
a centralized, rigidly 
hierarchical chain of command 
closed to all influences that 
might make its workings 
predictable. The internal social 
system of the bomb must be 
authoritarian; there is no other 
way (p. 34). 
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Truman‟s “Bombing of Hiroshima” speech 
was an agent of influence and became the 
benchmark of modern techno-political 
discourse. Truman‟s speech helped 
perpetuate the myth of scientific and 
technology progress in American life, not to 
mention attempt to justify the human and 
capital investment in the “race of the 
laboratory.” Truman‟s speech is not the only 
example of modern political discourse that 
exploits the myth of technological progress. 
In fact, significant speeches across the 
political spectrum make use of similar 
arguments as persuasive reasoning for 
political action. These speeches make up a 
genre of pro-technological political 
discourse that can be helpful in our 
understanding of future speeches that deal 
with science and technology. The following 
historical speeches are analyzed through the 
lens of these five basic tenets to test the 
existence of a possible genre: Dwight 
Eisenhower‟s “Atoms for Peace,” John F. 
Kennedy‟s “We Choose to Go to the Moon,” 
Ronald Reagan‟s “Defense and National 
Security,” and George H. Bush‟s “Stem Cell 
Decision.” In addition, we analyze Barack 
Obama‟s inaugural addresses from 2009 and 
2013 due to the explicit mention of science 
and technology.  
 
GENERIC SIMILARITIES IN 
TECHNO-POLITICAL ORATORY 
Four presidential speeches stand out as 
change-agents of technological public 
perception and political policy. 
Eisenhower‟s speech, “Atoms for Peace,” 
was delivered to the United Nations‟ 
General Assembly in New York City on 
December 8, 1953. It served many purposes, 
including reassuring Western Europe that 
the US did not want to use nuclear weapons; 
started a program that shared nuclear 
technology information and equipment with 
allied countries; set up standards, protocols, 
and regulations for the use of nuclear 
technology, which effectively limited the 
spread of nuclear weapons around the world; 
and comforted a weary US public that we 
could repurpose nuclear technology for 
peaceful means. Another important 
brainchild of Eisenhower‟s speech was the 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), which still plays an extremely 
significant role in international politics.  
 
John F. Kennedy‟s address, the second 
presidential speech analyzed here, was 
delivered on May 25, 1961, to a special joint 
session of Congress. In his speech, he 
promised to send an American safely to the 
Moon by the end of the decade, despite not 
having a plan in place and absent the 
technology needed to make it happen. His 
ambitious project was an obvious attempt to 
save face for the United States, which was 
losing to the Soviet Union in the space race. 
That Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin had become 
the first human in space on April 12, 1961, 
was an embarrassment to US politically. 
More than 400,000 workers later and a 
budget of more than $20 billion, much more 
of an investment than originally imagined 
(See Diaz, 2011), the US was successful in 
achieving Kennedy‟s promise on July 20, 
1969, when Astronaut Neil Armstrong 
stepped onto the Moon from the Lunar 
Module.  
 
The third speech, Ronald Reagan‟s speech 
on “Defense and National Security,” was a 
nationally televised address on March, 23, 
1983. This major Cold War speech proposed 
as part of his Strategic Defensive Initiative 
(SDI) the development of space-based 
satellites that could shoot down nuclear 
ballistic missiles launched by our enemies. 
This part especially was largely criticized by 
mainstream media and the scientific 
community as unfeasible since the 
technology did not yet exist and such 
66 
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technology might not even be possible. For 
this reason, it was also known by a more 
popular but also satirical name, Star Wars. 
Defense experts derided the proposal as it 
essentially called for the replacement of 
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) as the 
national defense policy, which may have 
revived the global offensive arms race.  The 
upshot of the speech, however, was research 
that resulted in the development of much of 
our anti-ballistic weapon systems today.  
The fourth speech was delivered by 
President George Bush on August 9, 2001, 
when he announced in a nationally televised 
speech that he was going to limit federal 
funding for stem cell research, a fairly new 
scientific field that had much potential for 
finding cures and treatments for major 
medical diseases, such as Parkinson‟s and 
Alzheimer‟s. While he insisted that he 
would not cancel funding for existing stem 
cell lines, he would not approve funding for 
any new lines over the sixty that already 
existed, despite that an overwhelming 
majority of the American public supported 
it. His address also called for a new 
presidential council on stem cell research, 
naming as its chair, Leon Kass—a 
conservative bio-ethicist from the University 
of Chicago, who was an opponent of stem 
cell research as well as in vitro fertilization. 
Bush eventually vetoed two separate bills on 
stem cell research, and supported legislation 
that would have made it a crime to conduct 
private research on stem cells derived from 
newly donated embryos.  
While not specifically focused on science 
and technology, the final two speeches in 
this analysis include Obama‟s 2009 and 
2013 inaugural addresses. While inaugural 
addresses are typically shorter and more 
generic in tone, Obama explicitly addresses 
the importance of research and development 
in science and technology to move the 
nation forward and improve our chances of 
remaining a global economic power while 
providing a better future for our children. 
 
A review of these speeches reveals a pattern 
of significance. A frequency search of their 
most commonly used words shows us that 
these seven speeches have similarities worth 
investigating (see chart below). All seven 
speeches repeatedly use the term “new.” 
Five of the speeches frequently use the terms 
“peace” and “great.” Four of the speeches 
repeat the terms “power” and “hope.” Many 
of these terms are frequently seen even as 
early as Truman‟s speech, which is perhaps 
more noteworthy. Although Obama 
employed the terms “new,” “peace,” “great,” 
“power,” “hope,” and “knowledge,” he also 
used other positive words in reference to 
science and technology, such as 
“understanding,” “strengthen,” 
“transformation” and “change.”  
 
 new peace great power hope knowledge 
Truman 3  7 13  5 
Eisenhower 8 26 16 12   
Kennedy 23 5 12  3 9 
Reagan 19 18  11   
Bush 4  12  7  
Obama 
2009 
3 2 2 1 2  
Obama 
2013 
2 3 1 2 3 1 
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Truman‟s speech in 1945 gave us a hint at 
five possible generic arguments that might 
be used by other political leaders when 
addressing the public on scientific and 
technological issues. Testing for the 
existence of these five statements in other 
major presidential addresses also tests the 
existence of a genre of pro-technological 
political discourse. Of the seven speeches 
analyzed in this study, six are overtly pro-
technology, and while Bush‟s speech was 
not exactly pro-science or pro-technology, it 
was a major presidential speech of 
significant importance to the scientific 
community, and was not wholly opposed to 
the science of stem cell research. Bush 
recognized the great possibilities of such 
research, but acted to slow the science to 
allow for a consideration of the ethical 
consequences. Lastly, while inaugural 
addresses usually have broad scope, both of 
Obama‟s speeches focus specifically on 
matters of science and technology, further 
evidence that science and technology creeps 
into all types of presidential discourse. All 
seven of these speeches, then, are valuable 
as texts to help us understand the generic 
possibilities of technological rhetoric.  
 
All six speeches briefly described above are 
reviewed with respect to these five generic 
arguments (see chart below). It is quickly 
apparent that defining technology as good 
(1) but in need of widespread support (4) are 
employed by all of them, while the claim 
that technology makes life easier (2) is only 
found in five speeches. Four speeches 
claimed that technological development is 
worth all risk (5). The least common claim, 
used by two speeches, was that technology 
fosters a healthy democracy and inspires 
citizen action (3). 
 
Possible Generic 
Arguments 
Eisenhower Kennedy Reagan Bush Obama 
2009 
Obama  
2013 
(1) Technology can be 
framed in terms of 
economic, intellectual, 
and moral goodness 
X X X X X X 
(2) Technological 
progress makes life 
better—efficient and 
more productive 
X X  X X X 
(3) Technology 
encourages citizen 
activation, 
democratization, and 
decentralized government 
  X   X 
(4) Technological 
progress requires 
economic and popular 
support 
X X X X X X 
(5) Technological 
setbacks are a worthy 
and honorable sacrifice 
X X X   X 
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ARGUMENT ONE: TECHNOLOGY IS 
GOOD 
That technology is always good and good 
for economic, intellectual, or moral reasons 
is the common refrain of all four speeches. 
Technology for Eisenhower can reveal 
“mankind‟s never-ending quest for peace 
and mankind‟s God-given capacity to 
build,” and move us “out of the dark 
chamber of horrors into the light, to find a 
way by which to minds of men, the hopes of 
men, the souls of men everywhere, can 
move forward towards peace and happiness 
and well-being.”  Even the “fearful trend of 
atomic military build-up can be reversed, 
this greatest of destructive forces can be 
developed into a great boon, for the benefit 
of all mankind.” For Kennedy, technology 
shows us that “man, in his quest for 
knowledge and progress, is determined and 
cannot be deterred” and provides us with an 
opportunity for “one of the great adventures 
of all time.” Economically, technology, such 
as that provided by the space effort, “has 
already created a great number of new 
company and tens of thousands of new 
jobs,” and generates “new demands in 
investment and skilled personnel.” For 
Reagan, technology can help us to be 
“prepared to meet all threats.” “Every item 
in our defense program,” he argues, “is 
intended for one all-important purpose: to 
keep the peace.” Bush argued, much like 
Kennedy, that science and technology can 
“improve human life” and “expand the 
limits of science and knowledge.” He asked, 
if frozen embryos are “going to be destroyed 
anyway, shouldn‟t they be used for a greater 
good, for research that has the potential to 
save and improve other lives?”  
 
ARGUMENT TWO: TECHNOLOGY 
MAKES LIFE EASIER 
Five of the seven speeches claimed that 
technology can make our lives easier either 
by increasing our efficiency or making us 
more productive. Eisenhower queried, for 
example, “Who can doubt that” this new 
technology “would rapidly be transformed 
into universal, efficient and economic 
usage?” The new atomic energy, according 
to him, would apply the technology “to the 
needs of agriculture, medicine and other 
peaceful activities,” with “a special 
purpose…to provide abundant electrical 
energy in the power-starved areas of the 
world.” Kennedy argued that the “growth of 
our science and education will be enriched 
by new knowledge of our universe and 
environment, by new techniques of learning 
and mapping and observation, by new tools 
and computers for industry, medicine, the 
home as well as the school.” He continued 
by claiming, “Technical institutions…will 
reap the harvest of these gains.” Bush 
argued, “Research using stem cells offers 
great promise that could help improve the 
lives of those who suffer from many terrible 
diseases.” In fact, “the United States has a 
long and proud record of leading the world 
toward advances in science and medicine 
that improve human life.” Our efforts in 
science and technology “have the potential 
for incredible good—to improve lives, to 
save life, to conquer disease.” In Obama‟s 
2009 Inaugural, he pledged to “restore 
science to its rightful place and wield 
technology‟s wonders to raise health care‟s 
quality and lower its cost.” 
 
ARGUMENT THREE: TECHNOLOGY 
IS HEALTHY FOR THE DEMOCRACY  
Here, Ronald Reagan argued that technology 
strengthens the democratic state and allows 
for a stronger, healthier citizenry. Our 
decision to support policy decisions that 
increase our technological defense systems, 
said Reagan, is a “hard but necessary task of 
preserving peace and freedom” especially in 
the face of “temptation to ignore our duty 
and blindly hope for the best while the 
enemies of freedom grow stronger day by 
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day.” Such technology offers “a new hope 
for our children of the 21
st
 century,” and is 
an issue that “involves the most basic duty 
that any president and any people share, the 
duty to protect and strengthen the peace.” 
Despite the expense, the technology can 
“prevent the greatest of human tragedies and 
preserve our free way of life in a sometimes 
dangerous world,” and can “make America 
strong again after too many years of neglect 
and mistakes.” In 2013, Obama stated the 
importance of “collective action” among 
citizens using technology as a tool for a 
better future. “No single person,” he argued, 
“can train all the math and science teachers 
we‟ll need to equip our children for the 
future, or build the roads and networks and 
research labs that will bring new jobs and 
businesses to our shores.” 
 
ARGUMENT FOUR:  TECHNOLOGY 
REQUIRES OUR SUPPORT 
Scientific discovery and new technological 
initiatives are not cheap, and major federal 
projects do not typically happen without 
popular support. All six speeches appealed 
to the public to explain and justify the 
expense and to rally the public‟s spirit. 
Eisenhower argued, “Every new avenue of 
peace, no matter how dimly discernible 
should be explored.” Kennedy said, “to be 
sure, all this costs us all a good deal of 
money,” but that to “do all this, and do it 
right, and do it first before the decade is 
out—then we must be bold.” “We must pay 
what needs to be paid,” he added, because 
“space is there, we‟re going to climb it, the 
moon and the planets are there, and new 
hopes for knowledge and peace are there.” 
Reagan argued, “the budget now before the 
Congress is necessary, responsible, and 
deserving of your support” for “I want to 
offer hope for the future.” Reagan expanded 
the appeal by claiming, “a strong national 
defense program is necessary because “we 
maintain our strength in order to deter and 
defend against aggression—to preserve 
freedom and peace.” He concluded his 
speech by arguing that “we‟re launching an 
effort which holds the promise of changing 
the course of human history.” Bush claimed 
in his speech that “federal dollars help 
attract the best and brightest scientists” and 
conceded that “rapid progress in this 
research will come only with federal funds.” 
With an obvious amount of trepidation, he 
concluded that “we should allow federal 
funds to be used for research on these 
existing stem cell lines, where the life-and-
death decision has already been made.” He 
also said that he believed “great scientific 
progress can be made through aggressive 
federal funding of research on umbilical 
cord, placenta, adult and animal stem cells, 
which do not involve the same moral 
dilemma.” In his 2009 Inaugural address, 
Obama reminded citizens that math and 
technology are needed to improve the 
quality of American life, and that “now 
more than ever, we must do these things 
together, as one nation and one people.”  
 
ARGUMENT FIVE: 
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IS 
WORTH THE RISKS 
That technological progress is worth all risk 
is a dubious supposition since no one knows 
the future of technological progress and 
what consequences await humanity. Without 
oversight, careful consideration, and 
dialogue, technological and scientific 
discovery of course has the potential to 
negatively affect life in a substantial way. 
Bush warned the public that there were 
difficult moral and ethical challenges that 
must be taken into consideration before 
moving forward with stem cell research. He 
argued that “the discoveries of modern 
science create tremendous hope, they also 
lay vast ethical mine fields.” The risks of 
technological and scientific discovery must 
be carefully measured and movement 
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forward must be slow. This is not a claim 
found in the other three speeches. Instead, in 
the other speeches, technological progress is 
said to be worth all risks because it offers 
the promise of a better life. Eisenhower 
argued that “against the dark background of 
the atomic bomb, the United States does not 
wish merely to present strength, but also the 
desire and the hope for peace.” He also 
pledged to “finding the way by which the 
miraculous inventiveness of man shall not 
be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to 
his life.” Kennedy claimed that “surely the 
opening vistas of space promise high costs 
and hardships, as well as high reward.” 
“This country,” he said, “was not built by 
those who waited and rested and wished to 
look behind them. The country was 
conquered by those who moved forward—
and so will space.” Reagan asked and then 
answered, “isn‟t it worth every investment 
necessary to free the world from the threat 
of nuclear war? We know it is.” “There will 
be risks,” he said, “and results take time. But 
I believe we can do it.” As oil reserves 
continue to decrease and fuel costs rise, 
Obama told citizens in his 2013 Inaugural 
“we cannot cede to other nations the 
technology that will power new jobs and 
new industries, we must claim its promise.” 
 
DISCUSSION 
It is easy to be seduced by technology and 
easy to ignore the implications on our ways 
of living. Most do not appreciate the 
discourse that pushes the development of it 
or the system of resources that creates it. 
Langdon Winner (2004) has called this 
phenomenon technological somnambulism, 
or sleepwalking through the technology. It is 
a common condition of the mind as most 
people view technologies as simple tools 
that they can pick up and put down again 
without consequence. Technology has 
become such a major part of our worldview 
that, as Postman (1993) has written, it helps 
shape “the ways in which people perceive 
reality" (p. 21). Any opposing worldview 
would be quickly rejected since, as Rokeach 
(1970) has argued, “the more central a belief 
the more it will resist change” (p. 3), and our 
belief in technology is very strong. 
 
This research has analyzed some of the 
political discourse that has influenced our 
positive perceptions of technology, helping 
to make certain technological innovations in 
the United States possible. This study of 
techno-political discourse helps reveal the 
rhetoric politicians have employed to 
perpetuate the mythology that technology is 
good, makes life better, and worth all risk. It 
is a mythology that sustains the public‟s 
belief in technology and convinces it to 
support innovation both psychologically and 
financially.  
 
The world changed following World War II 
and the invention of the atomic bomb. For 
the first time, it was now possible to destroy 
an entire city with a single piece of human-
built technology. It is for this reason that the 
atomic bomb has not been launched upon 
another city since Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
sixty-eight years ago. Political 
establishments are not naive, and no nation 
yet has dared such an action and risk equal 
or greater reprisal. But that is as far as the 
fear takes us. Tens of thousands of these 
bombs were developed, and most of these 
still exist, and each one of them threatens the 
world. Whether for human nature‟s want of 
power and control, amazing ignorance, or 
eternal optimism, bad technologies like the 
atomic bomb will always exist and flourish. 
Once a technology is built, it seems no 
amount of resistance is enough to eliminate 
it. The key is understanding the rhetorical 
processes that started it and the rhetorical 
processes that sustain it. Truman‟s speech 
shows us the power of discourse in shaping 
public perception of atomic technology, 
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inspiring a public already enamored by the 
innovation to keep building an arsenal with 
little thought to consequences. 
 
Truman‟s speech following his decision and 
then launch of the atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima set the standard for future 
presidential technological rhetoric. Many of 
his same arguments are found repeated in 
presidential addresses on technology 
throughout the later decades. Indeed, almost 
seven decades following Truman‟s speech 
about the benefits of atomic energy and his 
private concerns about its destruction, 
Obama still publicly praises science and 
technology as the country faces nuclear 
threats from North Korea and Iran. The six 
additional speeches analyzed by this paper 
suggest that most of Truman‟s strategies 
may be commonplace, forming the principle 
components of a pro-technological discourse 
genre. It certainly warrants future testing 
since understanding how and why new 
technology is adopted and diffused within 
society is critical. Humanity and technology 
have always and will always be intimately 
linked, and understanding why we privilege 
technology is a step toward understanding 
our nature as rhetorical beings.  
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